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Banks should evaluate whether a borrower is likely to default. I apply several techniques in 
the extensive mathematical literature of stochastic optimal control/dynamic programming to 
derive an optimal debt in an environment where there are risks on both the asset and liabilities 
sides. The vulnerability of the borrowing firm to shocks from either the return to capital, the 
interest rate or capital gain, increases in proportion to the difference between the Actual and 
Optimal debt ratio, called the excess debt. As the debt ratio exceeds the optimum, default 
becomes ever more likely. This paper is “A Tale of Two Crises” because the analysis is 
applied to the agricultural debt crisis of the 1980s and to the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 
2007. A measure of excess debt is derived, and we show that it is an early warning signal of a 
crisis.  
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A TALE OF TWO DEBT CRISES: A STOCHASTIC OPTIMAL CONTROL ANALYSIS 
      Jerome L. Stein 
 
1.  Introduction 
Bubbles are based upon anticipated but non-sustainable capital gains that are not closely 
related to the net productivity of capital. As a consequence, the rising debt payments/net income 
makes the system more vulnerable to shocks either from the capital gains, productivity of capital 
or the interest rate.  A crisis then occurs with bankruptcies and defaults. This paper addresses the 
question:  How should creditors, banks and bank regulators evaluate and monitor risk of an 
excessive debt that significantly increases the probability of default?  
This paper may be called: A Tale of Two Crises. The agricultural debt crisis of the 1980s 
is emblematic of the bubble-crisis phenomenon. I use this as a specific example of the usefulness 
of the stochastic optimal control analysis, because data are readily available
1 that correspond to 
the theoretical variables. One can just copy/paste the agriculture story in understanding the sub-
prime mortgage crisis of 2007.  
Agriculture flourished in the 1970s. Farm exports grew rapidly and along with the 
domestic inflation farm incomes reached all-time highs. These factors produced capital gains on 
farm assets. Equity rose significantly. Credit was readily available. Real interest rates were low 
and farmers used the rising value of farm assets as collateral for loans. Farmers would purchase 
farm real estate with moderate down payments and, after the value of the newly purchased land 
increased, would use the increased equity to buy additional farmland with minimal down 
payments.  Higher levels of real estate debt were supplemented by debt to finance machinery and 
equipment. The speculation in land produced capital gains and raised the market value of equity 
(EQUITY).  The ratio of interest service on the debt/value added (INTVA), the debt burden, rose 
significantly. See Figure 1. 
 In the fall of 1979, the Federal Reserve undertook a restrictive monetary policy in order 
to reduce inflation and interest rates rose drastically. The resulting appreciation of the US dollar 
reduced foreign demand for US agricultural products. The decline in foreign demand was 
exacerbated by the debt crisis in the less developed countries. Farm exports declined by 40% 
                                                 
1 I draw upon the study of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and use data from the 
Economic Research Service USDA. A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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from 1981 to 1986, at a time when productive capacity had increased. The result was an 
accumulation of huge surpluses of farm commodities in the early 1980s.  When the bubble 
collapsed in 1980, asset values and equity fell drastically.  The resulting rise in the debt burden 











Figure 1.  Agricultural Bubble. Normalized variables.  INTVA = interest payments/value added 
= debt burden. DELIQRATEFCS = delinquency rate, Farms Security Administration as a 
percent of loans. EQUITY = assets – liabilities. Source: USDA, Economic Research Service, 
Agriculture Income and Finance. Economic Research Service, USDA, Farm Income and Balance 
Sheet Indicators. 
 
The sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2006-2007 is similar. Demyanyk and Van Hemert 
utilized a data-base containing information about one half of all subprime mortgages originated 
between 2001 and 2006. They explored to what extent the probability of delinquency/default can 
be attributed to different loan and borrower characteristics and housing price appreciation. I use 
data from the FRED and OFHEO, cited under Figure 2. In part 6 below, I relate the statistical 
results to the Stochastic Optimal Control/Dynamic Programming (SOC/P) analysis. 
From 1998-2005 rising home prices produced above average capital gains (CAPGAIN), 
which increased owner equity. This induced a supply of mortgages, and the totality of household A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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financial obligations as a percent of disposable personal income (DEBTRATIO) rose (Figure 2). 
The rises in housing prices and owner equity induced a demand for mortgages by banks and 
funds. In about 45-55% of the cases, the purpose of the sub-prime mortgage taken out in 2006 
was to extract cash by refinancing an existing mortgage loan into a larger mortgage loan. The 
quality of loans declined. The share of loans with full documentation substantially decreased 
from 69% in 2001 to 45% in 2006 (Demyanyk and Van Hemert). Funds held packages of 
mortgage-backed securities either directly as asset-backed securities or indirectly through 
investment in central funds. The purchases were financed by short-term bank loans. Neither the 
funds nor the banks worried about the rising debt, because equity was rising due to the rise in 
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Figure 2. Mortgage Market Bubble. Normalized variables. Appreciation of single-family housing 
prices, CAPGAIN, 4q appreciation of US Housing prices HPI, Office Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OHEO); Household debt ratio DEBTRATIO = household financial 
obligations as a percent of disposable income. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED, Series 
FODSP.  
 
The large capital gains from 2003 – 2005 fell drastically from 12.2% pa in 2006q1 to 
1.79% pa in 2007q3. The delinquency rates in 2006, for each age of mortgage, were the highest A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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in the previous five years. Figure 2 shows that the level and change in capital gain was the lowest 
over the period. 
Many borrowers had little equity in their homes and found it difficult to sell or to 
refinance, because the debt exceeded the market value of the home. It was cheaper to default and 
avoid debt service than to rent new housing. Large banks and investors who made sub-prime 
loans or bought securities backed by them reported billions of dollars of losses. The massive 
unwinding of positions by highly leveraged investors such as hedge funds pushed the prices of 
both low and high quality sub-prime securities lower. Equity was further reduced, and the 
debt/equity ratio of borrowers and financial intermediaries rose. Banks reacted by reducing the 
supply of credit to the economy, and induced the Federal Reserve to change its monetary policy. 
One can just copy/paste the agriculture story in understanding the sub-prime mortgage crisis. 
Banks should evaluate whether the borrower is likely to default. I apply several 
techniques in the extensive mathematical literature of stochastic optimal control (SOC) to derive 
an optimal debt in an environment where there are risks on both the asset and liabilities sides. 
The ratio debt/net worth per se is not a significant explanation of defaults. The vulnerability of 
the firm to shocks, from either the return to capital, the interest rate or capital gain, increases in 
proportion to the excess debt, which is defined as the difference between the Actual and Optimal 
debt ratio. As the debt ratio exceeds the optimum, risk rises relative to expected return and 
default becomes ever more likely.  
There are several parts to the analysis: A criterion function, A structural model,  
Specification of the stochastic processes, and the solution using the Ito equation and (DP) 
Dynamic Programming. The basic references for the mathematical techniques used in this paper
2 
are Fleming & Soner (2006), Fleming (1999), Fleming & Stein (2004), and Stein (2004, 2005 
and 2006 ch. 3).  
 
2.  The Criterion Function 
The lender evaluates what debt would maximize the expected (E) growth rate of the 
borrower’s net worth over the period of the loan, an horizon of length T from the present t=0.  
                                                 
2 These techniques were used in Stein (2007) to analyze the whether the current US 
external debt should be a cause for serious concern.  
 A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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The borrower has a net worth X(t) equal to the value of capital K(t) less debt L(t). Initially net 
worth X = X(0) > 0. Eq. (1) is the criterion function. The bank wants to avoid borrower’s 
bankruptcy (X = 0) by placing an infinite penalty on a debt that would lead to a zero net worth, 
bankruptcy. Equation (1a) is an alternative form of Eq. (1). The lender is very risk averse, since 
X(T) = 0 implies that W is minus infinity.. 
(1) W(X,T) = max E ln [X(T)/X(0)],    X = K – L > 0. 
(1a) E [X(T)] = X(0) e
W(X,T)  
  The next steps are to: explain the stochastic differential equation for net worth, relate it to 
the debt ratio, and specify what are the sources and characteristics of the risk and uncertainty. 
 
3.  Dynamics of Net Worth 
In view of equation (1), the bank/lender should focus upon the change in net worth dX(t) 
of the borrower. It is the equal to the change in capital dK(t) less the change in debt dL(t). 
Capital K = PQ, the product a physical quantity Q times the relative price P of the capital asset to 
the price of output, such as the GDP deflator. The change in capital has two components. The 
first is the change due to the change in relative price of capital, which is the capital gain or loss, 
K(dP/P) term. The second is investment, which is I = P dQ, the change in the quantity times the 
relative price. The change in debt dL is the sum of expenditures less income. Expenditures are 
the debt service r(t)L(t) at real interest rate r(t), plus investment I = P dQ plus either 
consumption, dividends or distributed profits C(t). Income Y(t) = β(t)K(t) is the product of 
capital times β(t) its productivity. Combining these effects, the change in net worth is equation 
(2) and (2a).  
(2)dX(t) = K(t)[(dP/P) + β(t) dt] – r(t)L(t) dt – C(t) dt   
= K(t) b(t) dt – r(t)L(t) dt – C(t) dt. 
(2a) b(t) = (dP/P) + β(t) dt 
Stochastic variables in bold are the real capital gain or loss (dP/P), the productivity of 
capital β(t) and r(t) the real interest rate. Term b(t) in (2a) subsumes the two sources of risk on 
capital: the capital gain or loss and the productivity of capital. The agricultural debt crisis and the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis can be understood in terms of equations (1) - (2). In one case, capital 
is land and equipment, and in the other it is residential housing. 
 A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
 
7 
4.  The Stochastic Processes  
Figure 3 graphs the time series of two stochastic variables in the agricultural sector: the 
productivity of capital β(t) = Y(t)/K(t) and the interest rate r(t). The productivity of capital is 
measured as GVACAP = β(t) = gross value added/value of farm assets. The second is INTDEBT 
= r = total interest payments/debt. The capital gain term dP/P (not graphed here) is not 
significantly different from zero, but has a very high variance. It is stationary, so that it is mean 
reverting to zero. For the housing market, the productivity of capital β(t) is the imputed rental 
















Figure 3. Agriculture. GVACAP = gross value added/capital = productivity of capital = β(t), 
INTDEBT = total interest payments/debt = r(t). 
 
A crucial assumption motivating the use of SOC/DP is that the future is unpredictable
3. 
The uncertainty may have different forms. Since there is some ambiguity about describing the 
                                                 
3 The popular concept of “the inter-temporal budget constraint” is meaningless in such a context. 
See Stein (2006, pp. 7, 32-33, 63 and 228) for a detailed explanation. A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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specific form of the stochastic processes in Figure 3, I consider several cases. Case A assumes 
that the return on capital b(t) = (dP/P) + β(t) follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, Erogodic 
Mean Reversion (EMR), equation (3a). The solution of this equation implies that the return b(t) 
converges to a distribution with a mean of b, and a variance is σ
2
b /2α, where α is the speed of 
response. The interest rate r(t) is equation (4a), a Brownian Motion with Drift  (BMD) process. 
The mean is r and the variance is σ
2
r dt. Case B assumes that both the return to capital (Eq. 3b), 
and the interest rate (Eq. 4a) are described by Brownian Motion with Drift
4. Case C, equations 
(3b) and (4b), is the reverse of case A. The return is BMD but the interest rate is EMR.  
 
BOX 1. STOCHASTIC PROCESSES, UNCERTAINTY 
(3a) db(t) = α1(b – b(t)) dt + σb dwb    Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (EMR) 
(3b) b(t) = b dt + σb dwb                      Brownian Motion-Drift (BMD) 
(4a) r(t) = r dt + σr dwr      Brownian Motion-Drift  (BMD)  
(4b) dr(t) = α2 (r – r(t))dt + σr dwr    Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (EMR)  
The mean (b, r) is written without any time index. Case A is eq. (3a), (4a); Case B is eq. (3b), 
(4a), Case C is eq. (3b), (4b). 
 
5.  Solution and interpretation of the optimal debt/net worth 
 
The solution for the optimal debt ratio concerns the maximization of the expected growth 
rate of net worth, eq. (1) subject to eq. (2) and the appropriate stochastic process in BOX 1. 
There are other reasonable criteria functions and stochastic processes. The mathematical 
techniques for their solution are discussed in the Fleming and Stein references above. Here, I 
simply state the results and provide a graphic interpretation that relates to the economics 
literature. Then I use the results in discussing the two crises. 
The optimal debt/net worth ratio f*(t) = L(t)/X(t) in BOX 2 varies according to the three 
cases (A), (B) and (C) respectively. The asterisk denotes the optimal value. In each case, the 
numerator is a return less an interest rate, and the denominator is a variance.  
                                                 
4 Brownian Motion results from continuous independent increments with a zero 
expectation. See Øksendal. 




  BOX 2.  OPTIMAL DEBT/NET WORTH RATIO     
                                             Return/interest rate 
(5A) f*(t) = [b(t) – r]/σ
2
r    EMR/BMD,    σ
2
r = variance r(t) 
(5B) f* = (b – r)/σ
2  + f(0)    BMD/BMD,    σ
2 = variance (b-r) 
(5C) f*(t) = [b – r(t)]/σ
2
b.    BMD/EMR    σ
2
b = variance b(t) 
 
In case (A), equation (5A), the optimal ratio of debt/net worth f*(t) varies with time. It is 
equal to the current value of the return to capital b(t) less the mean  rate of interest r, divided by 
the variance of the interest rate var (r(t)). In case (B), equation (5B), the optimal debt/net worth 
f* is constant. It is equal to the mean return on capital less the mean interest rate, (b-r), divided 
by the variance var [b(t) – r(t)], which contains the covariances. The constant term f(0) is the 
debt ratio where the total risk is minimal. Case (C), equation (5C) is the reverse of case (A). The 
debt/net worth ratio f*(t) varies with time. It is equal to the mean return less the current interest 
rate divided by the variance of the return var b(t).  
Figure 4 is an interpretation of the expected growth rate in equation (6) in terms of a 
Mean-Variance diagram. There are two terms in the expected growth rate. The first term Mean is 
the straight line in figure 4/Eq. (6a). It is the expected growth rate for any debt ratio f(t), if there 
were no risk. The intercept is the appropriate return less the ratio C/X of (consumption-
dividends-distributed profits)/net worth. The slope is the appropriate return less the interest rate. 
The appropriate measure depends upon the relevant case, (A), (B) or (C). The second term in 
equation (6) is graphed as the parabola Risk in figure 4/Eq. (6b). It is the variance of the change 
in net worth.  





Figure 4 describes the solution of the H-J-B differential equation or Ito equation. The expected 
growth rate of net worth is the difference between the Mean line and the Risk parabola. Optimal 
debt ratio f* is found where the slope of the Mean Line equals the slope of the Risk parabola. 
When the debt ratio exceeds max-debt, the expected growth rate of net worth is negative. 
 
The expected growth rate of net worth in equation (6) corresponds to the difference between the 
straight line Mean and the parabola Risk in figure 4. In case (B), Mean and Risk are described by 
equations (6a) and (6b) respectively. The derivations are in Fleming & Stein (2004). In the other 
cases, see Stein (2005) for technical details. 
 
(6) (1/T) E [ln X(T)/X(0)] = Mean – Risk = expected growth rate.  
 (6a) Mean = (b – c) + (b – r)f 




2 – 2f(1+f) θρ] 
θ = σr/σb  ρ = correlation between (b,r) 
 
The optimal debt ratio f* maximizes the distance between Mean and Risk. It is the value in 
equations (5A), (5B) or (5C), depending upon the stochastic process. At this ratio, the expected 
growth rate is maximized for any given ratio C/X of consumption-dividends/net worth. A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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As the debt ratio f = L/X rises above the optimum f*(t), the Risk rises relative to the 
Mean, and the expected growth rate of net worth declines. At a debt ratio equal to max-debt, the 
expected growth rate is zero. When the debt ratio rises above max-debt, the expected growth rate 
is negative and risk is very high. The liklihood of bankruptcy increases continuously as the debt 
ratio rises above the optimum. The difference Ψ(t) = [f(t) - f*(t)] is the “excess debt” ratio. From 
figure 4, one sees that the likelihood of a serious decline in net worth that threatens bankruptcy is 
a continuous function of Ψ(t) the excess debt ratio. 
Figure 4 can be viewed in terms of the Value at Risk VaR concept
5. The latter is based 
upon a probability distribution of the profits or loss. The Value at Risk at the 99% level is 
VaR(99%) = 2.33 σ, where σ is the standard deviation of the distribution of the net income. This 
means that the probability of a greater loss is 1%. In figure 4, the Risk rises, and expected return 
declines, with the excess debt. Hence σ rises with the excess debt, Ψ(t). This means that the VaR 
rises with the excess debt, Ψ(t) = f(t) – f*(t). An Early Warning Signal EWS of a crisis should be 
the excess debt, appropriate to the stochastic process
6. 
 
6.  A Tale of Two Debt Crises: Agriculture and Subprime Mortgage 
 
Both the agriculture and subprime mortgage crisis can be understood in terms of the SOC/DP 
analysis and Early Warning Signals are thereby derived. A bubble is a situation described by 
equation (7). The capital gain exceeds the interest on the debt, which in turn exceeds the 
productivity of capital. The only way that the borrower can pay the interest is by cashing in on 
the capital-gain. 
(7) dP/P > r > β.    BUBBLE  P = price asset/GDP deflator 
(7a) dP/P < r.      BURST 
The basic proposition is that the relative price of an asset to the GDP deflator cannot continue to 
rise. When P stabilizes at a value related to the productivity of capital the capital gain dP/P 
disappears. A sufficient condition for the bubble to burst is that the relative price P stabilizes, 
dP/P = 0. The capital gain dP/P is less than r(t)  the interest on he debt. When the bubble bursts, 
Eq. (7a), the borrowers are not able to refinance, cash in the capital gain, at the low old interest 
                                                 
5 See Crouhy et al Chapter 7 for a discussion of the usefulness of the VaR for risk management. 
6 As the debt ratio exceeds max-debt, the expected growth rate becomes more negative and the 
variance rises. That is, the probability distribution of the growth rate shifts to the left.  A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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rate. Then b(t) – r(t) becomes negative. The cash flow plus the (zero or negative) capital gain is 
insufficient to service the debt.  
The “market” used improper estimates of the variables that determine the optimal ratio in 
BOX 2. For the net return b(t) – r(t), the borrowers/lenders used [β(t) + dP(t)/P(t)] – r(t)], where 
dP/P is the capital gain based upon the recent past values, which were not linked to the 
productivity of capital. The error was to assume that the mean capital gain dP/P in Eq. (5B) 
could be  based upon the values in the recent past
7. Since their estimate of b(t) was high, say b1,  
and they assumed that the risk σ
2 = σ1
2 was low they incurred a high debt ratio f1 = (b1 – r)/σ
2. 
When the capital gain disappeared – the bubble burst - the optimal debt ratio was considerably 
below the ratio f1 = (b1 – r)/σ
2 they incurred. For example, the new optimal ratio was f* in figure 
4, whereas they were holding what is now a value f1 above max-debt. In figure 1, the fall in 
agricultural equity – the collapse of the bubble - is seen in EQUITY. In figure 2, the bursting of 
the mortgage market bubble is seen in the decline in the capital gain CAPGAIN, which became 
capital losses.  
If they optimized on the basis of Eq. (5A), the assumption was that they could quickly 
and at negligible cost reduce their debt to a new level, based upon a lower b(t) – r(t). The error 
was to ignore the fact that when the equity bubble burst, they would have great difficulty in 
selling their assets at the pre-existing prices, because many other borrowers are also trying to sell 
the asset to pay off the debt. This liquidation generates bankruptcies and defaults. 
What are Early Warning Signals of a debt crisis? How should the borrowers and lenders 
have optimized? Consider each case in turn: agriculture, subprime mortgage market. 
 
6.1. Agriculture 
The appropriate measure of the return in Equations (5A) – (5C) depends upon the stochastic 
process. The capital gain term dP/P has a mean that is not significantly different from zero. 
Therefore in Eq. (5B), the mean return b = β, the productivity of capital, is the mean ratio of 
value added/capital (GVACAP). The numerator of f* should be (β – r) = the productivity of 
                                                 
7 There are many articles in the mathematical finance literature concerning the best way to 
estimate if the drift term has changed. Some use the Kalman filter. Others use estimates of 
conditional probability. See for example Blanchet-Scalliet et al. (2007). In the context of the Two 
Debt Crises, I use the basic proposition that relative price P cannot grow steadily. Optimization 
should not be based upon capital gains that are unrelated to the productivity of capital. A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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capital (GVACAP) less interest rate (INTDEBT), which are graphed in figure 3 above. Their 
difference GVACAP – INTDEBT is the numerator of the optimal debt ratio. 
 If the stochastic process implies Eq. (5A) or (5C), then the return should be based upon 
the current value of one variable and the mean value of the other variable. However, in each 
case, the expected capital gain terms should be set at zero. A relative price cannot have a long 
term mean positive growth rate. 
One cannot be sure what is the appropriate stochastic process and hence optimal debt 
ratio. Therefore I take several approaches. In Case B, the optimal debt ratio is Eq. (5b).  Using 
the mean values for (β – r) and its variance σ
2, the optimal debt ratio is  
(L*/X) = f* = 23.5  
The actual debt/net worth ratio rose from 21.2 in 1970 to 29.8 in 1985 – a 41% rise. The 
delinquency rate on the debt (DELIQRATE in fig. 1) rose by more than two standard deviations 
in the mid 1980s.  
A general approach in evaluating debt and obtaining Early Warning Signal is that the 
optimal debt ratio should follow the net return (b(t) – r(t)). In Eq. (5A) the appropriate net return 
is [β(t) – r], in Eq. (5b) it is (β-r) and in Eq. (5c) it is [β – r(t)]. In figure 5, the curve labeled 
RETVAINTD is the normalized value of  [β(t) – r(t)]. It is: 
(8) RETVAINTD = [(β(t) – r(t)) – (β – r)]/ σ,    
σ = standard deviation of (b(t)-r(t)),  (β-r) = mean net return 
The debt ratio in the optimization is f = L/X = debt/net worth. However, there is a bias in 
using this as an empirical measure of an Early Warning Signal (EWS). The reason is that as net 
worth EQUITY collapses, this ratio jumps up violently. For this reason, in empirical work I 
prefer to use the ratio h = L/Y of debt (L) to (Y) to net income. Call h the debt ratio. In figure 5, 
the normalized value of the debt ratio is: 
(9) DEBTNINC = [L(t)/Y(t) – (L/Y)]/σ   
σ = standard deviation of [L(t)/Y(t)],   L/Y = mean (L(t)/Y(t)) 
The optimal debt ratio should either follow RETVAINTD, (Eq. (5A), (5C)) or be 
constant (Eq. (5B). My measure of an excess debt Ψ(t) is the difference between the normalized 
curves in figure 5. Non-optimal debt would occur if the debt ratio were rising relative to its long 
term mean when the net return was declining relative to its mean. 












1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
DEBTNINC RETVAINTD
 
Figure 5. Agriculture. DEBTNINC = L/Yn = Debt/net income; RETVAINTD = 
GVACAP - INTDEBT = (gross value added/assets - interest rate).  Normalized 
variable = (variable - mean)/standard deviation.  
 
In figure 5, the normalized net return fell by about 3 standard deviations from 1975 – 
1980, but the debt ratio rose by about 3 standard deviations during that period. The excess debt 
Ψ(1980) was about 4 standard deviations. This corresponds to a large deviation between the 
actual debt ratio and max-debt in figure 4. A large value of deviation Ψ(t) is an EWS of an 
impending crisis. This crisis did indeed occur, seen in figure 1, with the bankruptcies and 
defaults. During the periods when Ψ(t) was small, there were no crises. 
 
6.2.Subprime Mortgage Market 
A similar method of analysis can be applied to the subprime mortage market. I interpret 
the study by Demyanyk and Van Hemert (D-VH) on the basis of the SOC/DP analysis. They had 
a data base consisting of one half of the US subprime mortgages originated during the period 
2001-2006. At every mortgage age, loans originating in 2006 had a higher delinquency rate than A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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in all the other years since 2001. They examined the relation between the probability Π of 
delinquency/foreclosure/binary variable z, denoted as Π = Pr(z) and sensible economic variables, 
vector X. They investigated to what extent a logit regression Π = Pr(z) = Φ(βX) can explain the 
high level of delinquencies of vintage 2006 mortgage loans. Vector β is the estimated regression 
coefficients.  
They estimated vector β based upon a random sample of one million first-lien subprime 
mortgage loans originated between 2001 and 2006. The first part to their study provides 
estimates of β, the vector of regression coefficients telling us the importance of the variables in 
vector X  
The second part inquires why the year 2006 was so bad. The approach is based upon the 
equation (11). The contribution C(i) of component Xi  in vector X to why the probability of 
default in  year 2006 was worse than the mean is:  
(11) C(i) = (δΠ/δXi) dXi = Φ(βXm + βi dXi )– Φ(βXm),    m = mean value 
The probability of delinquency when the vector X is at its mean value is Φ(βXm). The added 
probability resulting from the change in component Xi in 2006 comes from βidXi where βi is the 
regression coefficient of element Xi whose change was dXi.   
Table 1 below (based upon D-VH, table 3) displays the largest factors that made the 
delinquencies and foreclosures in year 2006 worse than the mean over the entire period. For year 
2006, the largest contribution to delinquency and to foreclosure was the low house price 
appreciation. It accounted for 1.08% of the greater delinquencies and 0.61%  for the greater 
foreclosures. The debt/income, the balloon dummy and the documentation variables
8 are 
significantly smaller.   
                                                 
8 See D-VH table 2 for definitions of variables. 




Table 1. Contribution C(i) of factors to probability of delinquency and defaults 
2006, relative to mean for the period 2001-2006 (D-VH, table 3) 
Variable X(i)  Contribution C(i) to 
delinquency rate 
Contribution C(i) to 
foreclosure rate 
House price appreciation  1.08 %  0.61 % 
Balloon  0.18  0.09 
Documentation  0.16  0.07 
Debt/income  0.15  0.04 
 
Their results can be related to the mathematical analysis above and to the results for 
agriculture in figure 5. In agriculture or in any other commercial enterprise, the concept of the 
productivity of capital is explicit. In the home mortgage market, this concept is implicit. One 
could argue that by owning a home one saves rental payments. Then the productivity of housing 
capital to households is the implicit net rental income/value of the home plus a convenience yield 
in owning one’s home. This concept would correspond to β = Y/K in eq. (2) above. I also 
assume that the convenience yield in owning a home has been relatively constant. I try to 
approximate β by using the normalized ratio of rental income/disposable personal income. In 
figure 7 variable RENTRATIO = [(rental income/disposable personal income) – mean]/standard 
deviation. 
The sub-prime mortgage story is the following. The capital gains in housing CAPGAIN 
(normalized in figure 2) induced households to take out mortgages in order to extract cash to 
finance expenditures. Moreover, the rising value of equity served as collateral for home equity 
loans to finance all sorts of household expenditures.  
Figure 6 describes the statistics underlying the capital gains variable, the four- quarter 
appreciation of US housing prices dP/P. The distribution is highly skewed to the right. These 
extreme observations are the bubble years. The median appreciation over the entire sample 
period is 5.2% p.a. During the bubble period 2004-2007, the 30- year mortgage rate fluctuated 
between 6 and 6.5% pa. The GDP deflator varied between 2 and 4% pa. It is reasonable to argue A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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that the longer run real appreciation of housing prices was not significantly greater than “the 















Mean        5.436757
Median    5.220000
Maximum   13.50000
Minimum   0.270000
Std. Dev.    2.948092
Skewness    0.562681




Figure 6. Histogram and statistics of CAPGAIN, the four- quarter appreciation of US housing 
prices. This is the same variable normalized in figure 2. 
 
The actual debt ratio f(t) was induced by [β(t) + dP/P – r]/σ
2, where dP/P represents the 
capital gains. The dramatic rise in housing equity induced a drastic rise in total household debt 
(DEBTRATIO, Figure 2). From 1990 the capital gains in housing dP/P rose and the personal 
saving ratio/disposable income fell. The decline in the household saving ratio is linked to the rise 
in f(t) the debt ratio, though as Guidolin and La Jeunesse point out there is no simple explanation 
for the trend decline in the personal saving ratio. 
Cash flow is K(t) dP(t)/P(t) and interest payments are r(t)L(t). As long as the quantity net 
cash flow Y(t) =  [(dP/P(t) – r(t)L(t)/K(t)] is positive, more debt is induced to either spend or 
                                                 
9 Table 1 in (D-VH) contains descriptive statistics for the first lien subprime loans. There are four 
main mortgage types, each one bearing different “interest rates”. They are: Fixed rate mortgages 
(FRM), Adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), Hybrid and Balloon. The percentage of all the loans in 
these types varied significantly by period. For example: 
    2001    2006 
FRM    41.4%    26.1% 
ARM    0.9    12.8 
Hybrid    52.2    46.2 
Balloon   5.5    14.9. 
 A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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purchase a home. Suppose that it is the latter, L(t)/K(t) = 1. The bubble is described by eq. (7) 
where dP/P > r > β. The crisis will occur when (7a) dP/P < r, the appreciation of housing prices 
is less than r, the rate of interest. Then net cash flow Y(t) is negative. 
Falling growth in housing prices was the most significant variable accounting for the rise 
in the delinquency and default rates in table 1. This is consistent with the observation (Federal 
Reserve San Francisco) that there was a negative correlation between the rate of house-price 
appreciation and level of sub-prime delinquencies among metropolitan statistical areas.  
There is a great heterogeneity in interest rates charged to the subprime borrowers, so it is 
difficult to state exactly what corresponds to r(t) in the analysis above. I therefore use 
“Household Debt Service Payments as a Percent of Disposable Personal Income” (TDSP in 
FRED) as a measure of rL/Y the debt burden. This includes all household debt, not just the 
mortgage debt, because the capital gains led to a general rise in consumption and debt. The 
normalized value is labeled DEBTSERVICE in figure 7. 
DEBTSERVICE = [(Household debt service/disposable personal income) – mean]/st. dev. 
Figure 7 plots the values of the two normalized variables: DEBTSERVICE and 
RENTRATIO. The difference between the two normalized curves in figure 7 is a measure of 
excess debt. Variables in figure 7 are measured as standard deviations from their means. 
Equation (12) for the mortgage market corresponds to eq. (10) in agriculture. 
(12) Ψ(t) = DEBTSERVICE - RENTRATIO. 
The productivity of capital RENTRATIO was not rising, but L/Y the debt ratio (figure 2) 
was rising rapidly. The rising debt could only be serviced from capital gains. Assume that over 
the earlier period 1980 – 1998 the debt ratio was not excessive. From year 2000, the debt service 
deviated significantly from the rent ratio, because the actual debt ratio f(t) was stimulated by 
(dP/P – r ), the appreciation of housing prices relative to the interest rate.  
The excess debt Ψ(t) = f(t) – f*(t) in 2004 was two standard deviations, which is an EWS 
of a crisis. The only thing that held off the crisis was the capital gain in excess of the interest 
rate.  Net cash flow Y(t) was positive. But housing prices P cannot continue to grow at a rate 
above the interest rate
10.  We can be sure that, sooner or later, (7a) will occur. As soon as the 
                                                 
10 Let the housing price be P(t), the mortgage rate of interest r(t), the rate of inflation of the GDP 
or CPI is π(t) and the real rate of interest is i(t). Thus the mortgage rate of interest is r(t) = i(t) + 
π(t). The difference between the capital gain and the mortgage rate of interest is; A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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appreciation stopped, dP/P became less than interest rate r. There would be no capital gains that 
could be converted into cash to pay the interest. When the households lost equity, the choice was 
between servicing the debt r(t)L(t) or abandoning the property and renting rather than owning 
housing. When eq. (7) becomes (7a), a crisis occurs with the consequent delinquencies, 
bankruptcies and defaults. As D-VH found, the most significant variable in explaining why year 
2006 was so bad was that housing price appreciation disappeared. In terms of our analysis, debt 
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Figure 7. RENTRATIO = normalized rental income/disposable personal income, 




                                                                                                                                    
Z (t) = [(dP(t)/P(t) – i(t) - π(t)]. This can only be positive if the real appreciation of the housing 
[dP(t)/P(t) – π(t)] exceeds the real rate of interest i(t). This is not a sustainable situation where the 
relative price of housing to the general price level is steadily rising. A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
How should lenders and investors optimally manage risk to avoid losses from the defaults 
and bankruptcies of the borrowers? The Agricultural debt crisis of the 1980s and the subprime 
mortgage crisis of 2007 followed similar scenarios. In each case, the growth of the debt was 
stimulated by capital gains on assets. Capital gains are not sustainable unless they reflect the 
growth of the productivity of capital. When the capital gains fall below the interest owed, a crisis 
will occur. 
The object of this study is to evaluate if the debt is likely to lead to default and thereby 
derive theoretically based Early Warning Signals EWS of the vulnerability of the debtor to 
shocks. Given that the future is unpredictable, the optimal debt ratio is derived using the 
mathematical techniques of stochastic optimal control/dynamic programming (SOC/DP).  
There are many sensible criteria of optimization. Since we are looking at the problem 
from the point of view of the lender/bank, we focus upon the debt/net worth ratio that would 
maximize the expected growth of the borrower’s net worth over a given horizon. This is a risk 
averse strategy because it corresponds to maximizing the expected logarithm of net worth over a 
fixed horizon. 
The evolution of net worth depends upon three stochastic variables and the selected debt 
ratio. The stochastic variables are: the productivity of capital, the interest rate and the relative 
price of assets/price of output. The optimum debt ratio depends upon the stochastic processes. In 
one case, the sum of the productivity of capital and the capital gain is assumed to be ergodic 
mean reverting (EMR), and the interest rate is Brownian Motion with drift (BMD). In the second 
case, the capital gain is assumed to have a zero mean, and both the productivity of capital and the 
interest rate are BMD. In each case, the optimal ratio debt/net worth is positively related to a 
measure of the productivity of capital less an interest rate and negatively related to a measure of 
variance, appropriate to the specific stochastic processes. In neither case should one assume that 
the capital gain, the growth of a relative price, will continue to exceed the interest rate. 
The optimal debt/net worth ratio is derived in these two cases. The vulnerability to 
shocks from the stochastic variables is not directly related to the actual debt ratio. It is, however, 
directly related to the excess debt, equal to the actual less the optimal debt ratio. As the excess 
debt rises, the probability of a decline of net worth and the expected loss increase. Thereby our 
EWS is the magnitude of the excess debt. A TALE OF TWO DEBTCRISES 
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The SOC/DP analysis is applied to the two crises. In agriculture, the unit is a commercial 
firm concerned with profits and there is a clear concept of the productivity of capital. In the 
home mortgage market, the unit is a household where the implicit rental income/net worth is the 
closest approximation to the productivity of capital. The story of the subprime mortgage crisis of 
2006-2007 is a copy/paste of the agricultural debt crisis of the 1980s. In each case I derives EWS 
based upon measurable variables of an impending crisis.  
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